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An Introduction to Environmental Thought:
Some Sources and Some Criticisms
CHARLES J.

MEYERS*

Natty Bumppo, the leather-dad, direct-speaking frontiersman in
James Fenimore Cooper's Leather-Stocking Tales, once asked, "[W]hat
has a man who lives in the wilderness to do with the ways of the law?'' 1
As a legal scholar concerned with resource management and environmental protection, and not as a philosopher or historian, I am inclined
to rephrase Natty's question: "How does the law derive from the ways
of man and the wilderness?" This article will attempt to sketch out
some answers to that question. The task is a formidable one. A
historian of ideas could spend a lifetime on this subject and barely
identify, much less analyze, the vast number of strands that make up
the fabric of environmentalism. Nonetheless, I believe that legal
scholars, practicing lawyers, judges, and law students should be concerned with the intellectual and cultural history of major ideological
movements affecting the development of law. This is so because, at
root, law reflects cultural attitudes and value choices of the society.
To be sure, the law may alter by a few degrees the course of a cultural
or ideological movement. Nevertheless, within broad limits, the direction
of social action is ultimately set by ideas whose roots typically lie outside
the legal system and the legal profession.
This article is limited to just three major contributions to environmental thought. These three do not begin to exhaust the catalog, but
they are probably the dominant ideas influencing environmental thought
today, and they are likely to continue to be the chief elements in environmental thinking in the future. These three intellectual forces are: (1)
nature and wilderness philosophy, (2) ecology, and (3) economics. Each
will be examined in turn, in an attempt to discover their fundamental
* Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Stamford University; Co-author, Oil and
Gas Law (1959, 1964), Cases on Oil and Gas Law 3d ed. 1974), Water Resource Management (1971). B.A. 1949, Rice University; LL.B. 1949, University of Texas; LL.M. 1953,

J.S.D. 1964, Columbia University.
This article is a revision of the Addison C. Harris Lectures given at the Indiana
University School of Law on November 11-12, 1974. I wish to thank James Baer,
J.D.-M.B.A. [1976], Stanford University, for his research assistance in the preparation
of the lectures, and Professors Gerald Gunther, Kenneth E. Scott, and A. Dan Tarlock
for valuable suggestions on the revision.
I J. CooPER, THE PIONEERS 318 (1959).
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premises and the effects they have had on the environmental movement.
As shall be seen, this tripartite division is not nearly so neat as te classifications might suggest. The strands of thought are interwoven; and, as
in a balanced natural ecology, to remove one element without disturbing
the others is altogether impossible.

Let us begin with nature and wilderness valueF. In 1973, Not Man
Apart, a magazine published by Friends of the Earth, conducted a poll
of prominent environmentalists to name the books to enter an Environmental Hall of Fame. Silent Spring by Rachel Carson and A Sand
County Almanac by Aldo Leopold easily led the fidd. Leopold's classic
provides an ideal starting point for a discussion of wilderness values.
Leopold, both scholar and outdoorsman, was a man who learned
the value of wilderness through direct experience. Trained as a forester
at Yale University, Leopold spent 15 years in the United States Forest
Service and the rest of his career at the University of Wisconsin. That
blend of experience is reflected in A Sand County Almanac, first published in 1948 and still a strong influence on enviromental thinking. A
collection of essays, the book is at once graceful and exhorting, poetic
and gently resigned. Shortly after its publication, Leopold died tragically, fighting a brush fire on a neighbor's land, just a short distance
from his beloved farmhouse on the Wisconsin River. In the foreword
i
Leopold writes:
Conservation is getting nowhere because it is incompatible with our
Abrahamic concept of land. We abuse land because we regard it
as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community
to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect....
That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but that
land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics. That land
yields a cultural harvest is a fact long known, but latterly often for2
gotten..
Leopold celebrates nature and all the little things in it-including
man. Leopold is no misanthrope: he assures us that man has his place
in nature if only he would keep it. Man keeps his place through ethics,
which Leopold terms "a limitation on freedom of a:tion in the struggle
for existence." 3 But what values in nature and the wilderness are strong
enough to temper man's struggle for existence? Leopold suggests three.
2 A. LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC vifi-ix (1974).
3

Id. at 202.
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There is, first, the value of an experience that recalls to memory our
distinctive national origins and history. Leopold calls this the "splitrail value ' 4 and points to the Boy Scout who is reminded of Daniel
Boone when he ventures into the forest; the Scout is reenacting a small
bit of American history. Secondly, the wilderness experience reaffirms
man's membership in the ecological chain. Leopold repeatedly emphasizes this theme of the interrelationship of all natural things, insisting
that man's efforts must move toward the soil and not away from it.'
Leopold's third value is the collection of restraints on behavior called
"sportsmanship."'8 Wilderness sportsmanship is largely an internal force,
for the hunter or angler is solitary-he appeals to no gallery and is applauded by no grandstand. He is dependent, therefore, on his own
conscience and his own moral judgment to uphold the ethic. And that
ethic-teaches self-reliance, hardihood, and thrift.
Of these three values, the first-the "split-rail value"-is the most
uniquely American, for American culture has developed, at every stage,
with an acute awareness of wilderness-although more often in the
direction of clearing the land, rather than saving it." Nevertheless, consciousness of wilderness has been essential to the American character,
and a constant source of national pride. Columbus wrote of "fields
4Id. at 177-78.
5Id. at 178.
a8d.
7 Nature as a formidable adversary is a counter, though secondary, theme in the
American consciousness.
The Chronicles of Nathaniel Morton, keeper of the records of Plymouth Colony,
record Ithe
Pilgrims' reaction upon encountering North America:
Besides,
what could they see but a hideous and desolate wilderness, full
of
wilde beasts and wilde men? and what multitudes of them there were, they
then knew not: for which waysoever they turned their eyes (save upward to
Heaven) they could have but little solace or content in respect of any outward
object; for summer being ended, all things stand in appearance with a weather-

beaten face, and the whole country, full of woods and thickets, represented a
wild and savage hew.
Quoted in Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1974, at 16, col. 1. And Willa Cather echoes the attitude:
But the great fact was the land itself, which seemed to overwhelm the little be-

ginnings of human society that struggled in its somber wastes. It was from facing this vast hardness that the boy's mouth had become so bitter; because he felt
that men were too weak to make any mark here, that the land wanted to be let
W.

alone, to .preserve its own fierce strength, its peculiar, savage kind of beauty,
its uninterrupted mournfulness.
CATHER, 0 PIONEERS! 15 (1941).
A powerful, contemporary novel portrays the struggle of man against nature and

its denizens (including other men as barbaric as nature itself). J. DicxEy,

(1970).

DELIVERANCE

For a fuller development by a philosopher of the cultural and intellectual history
developed in Part I of this article, see Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment,
84 YALE L.J. 205 (1974).
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very green and full of an infinity of fruits as red as scarlet, and everywhere there was the perfume of flowers and the singing of birds very
sweet."' Similarly, early American writers-Widliam Cullen Bryant,
Washington Irving, and James Fenimore Cooper-boasted of America's
wild beauty. In The Sketch Book, Washington Iri ing wrote:
I visited various parts of my own country; and had I been merely
a lover of fine scenery, I should have felt little desire to seek elsewhere its gratification, for on no country have the charms of nature
been more prodigally lavished.'
That reverence for the American wilderness lit the inner eye with which
early Americans saw nature. Certainly Daniel Boone's relation to
wilderness exemplifies that love and respect for the community of nature
advocated by Leopold. A further dimension is thus added to the "splitrail value," for the hiker who likens his wilderness adventure to the
pioneering of Daniel Boone does so not only with Leopold's notion of
patriotism, but also with a profound sense of responsibility-a responsibility to live up to Boone's values. What does our hiker imagine
Boone's values to be? Precisely the final two values which Leopold
himself emphasizes: membership in the ecological chain, and wilderness
sportsmanship.
The second of Leopold's values-man's recognition of his place
in the ecological chain-is representative of the thinking of many environmentalists and natural philosophers. His analysis is in two parts:
the rejection of private property and capitalist institutions, and their
replacement with a land ethic based on adherence to belief in the laws
of nature. Leopold's condemnation of ownership institutions goes
beyond the traditional debate between economists and environmentalists
over the sources of human behavior. The economist holds that private
ownership protects the land because man is self-interested and will
protect what he owns outright, but will not care for what is collectively
owned-"The Tragedy of Commons" as it is called by Garret Hardin."
Many environmentalists take a sharply different view of human behavior,
contending that private ownership fosters greater abuses than does public
ownership. Leopold, however, goes further: he suggests that any
notion of land ownership is abusive. Remember his statement: "We
abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us.""
8 Quoted in R. LORD, BEHOLD
0

OuR LAND 77 (1938).
W. IRVING, THE SKETCH BOOK 2 (1963).

20 Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScIENcE 1243 (1968).
11 A. LEOPOLD, supra note 2, at viii.
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This concept is more fully developed in his essay, The Land Ethic.1 2
It recalls that Ulysses, returning from the Trojan Wars, hanged on one
rope a dozen slave girls suspected of misbehavior. The hanging was
considered proper, Leopold tells us, because the girls were property.
With this illustration, Leopold makes his key point: land, like the
slave girls, when viewed as property, entails privileges without obligations. Leopold calls for neither private nor collective ownership. Instead, he proposes a land ethic l ased on recognition of nature as a community to which man belongs. Man's role changes from conqueror of
the land-community to citizen. What we might characterize as
"Leopold's Basic Law" states:. "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is
wrong when it tends otherwise.""
Leopold's ethic is based on the interdependence of man and nature.
A related concept, the harmony of man and nature, can be traced to the
18th century religious philosophy called Deism. Deism was a product
of the Enlightenment, which was itself primarily a product of Sir Issac
Newton's scientific discoveries. As Alexander Pope wrote:
Nature and Nature's law lay hid in night,
God said: "Let Newton be," and all was light.1
Prior to Newton and the Enlightenment philosophers, religious
thinkers considered man the central character in an intricately ordered
universe. God alertly governed three interconnected domains-the
universe, the world of created objects, and human society-with man as
the focal point of each. The earth was at the center of the celestial
domain; man stood at the center of the ranks of created beings; and
nobles ruled society by divine right. In this anthropocentric world view,
man did not consider himself a citizen of the community of nature.
Western Man saw himself as something separate, distinct, and somehow
above the workings of nature. All this changed with Newton's theories
of the universe. Newton's universe resembled an infinite cosmic ocean,
throughout which the laws of physics and nature reigned uniformly over
the tiniest things on earth as well as over the farthest stars.
This mechanical model of the universe disrupted the older hierarchical world view. Nature came to be seen as a system of harmoniously
interrelated parts subject to immutable laws of science. And man came
to be regarded as an integral element of the natural world; he was neither
12 Id. at 201-02.
i8 Id. at 224-25.
4 Quoted in DEiSM

AND NATURAL RELIGION

vi (E. Waring ed. 1967).
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separated from nature by Original Sin, nor elevated above the workings
of natural law. "Why should God interpose to alter the determinations
of human will, more than the operations of nature?" a contributor of
The American Magazine asked in 1769,15 as did many contemporary
American leaders. George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas
Jefferson, Elihu Palmer, and Revolutionary War heroes Charles Lee
and Ethan Allen were all among the advocates of the pure and simple
Religion of Nature espoused by the Deists. Jonathan Dickinson, President of the .College of New Jersey, praised "the glorious art and contrivance of [this] admirable frame of nature."'" Similarly, the eminent
Boston preacher, Jonathan Mayhew, lectured about the regularity and
harmony of the natural order. But it was Thomas Paine who liest expressed the Deist ethic:
When we survey the works of Creation, the revolutions of the
planetary system, and the whole economy of what is called Nature,
which is not other than the laws the Creator has prescribed to
matter, we see unerring order and universal harmony reigning
throughout the whole. No one contradicts another. . . . Everything keeps its appointed time. . . . Here then is the standard to
which everything
must be brought that pretends to be the work or
7
word of God.1
In Deism, we find a philosophical origin of environmental awareness, an
early expression of a land ethic comparable to Leopold's. For Deists,
nature was not merely an economic resource, but the work and representation of God in which one could contemplate His power, His wisdom, and His munificence. In that God and nature came to be seen as
inseparable, man's ideal relation to nature became one of adoration,
and tenderness. As the British Deist, Charles Blount, insists: "Our
Religion must necessarily be this, to do good to [His] Creatures; for
therein we concur with the will of God."' 8 This sounds much like
Leopold's Basic Law'--right consists of obedience to and respect for
nature.
Deism was too impersonal to satisfy the spiritual requirements of
most Americans. They were engaged in a difficult struggle for survival
and needed assurance that salvation would come. Yet, the impact of
Deism on environmental thought has been significant. By identifying the
Quoted in H. MoRAis, DEisM IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERiCA 89 (1934).
1 Id. at 54.
27T. PAINE, The Prospect Papers, in 4 WRITINGS oF THOMAS PAINE 339 (M.
15

Conway ed. 1896).
18 Blount, The Oracles of Reason, quoted in H. MORAIs, supra note 15, at 31-32.

"9A. LEOPoLD, supra note 2, at 224-25.
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universe as a body of parts harmoniously interrelated, and subject to
uniform and purposeful laws, several of the more stifling beliefs of
Christianity were eroded: (1) Man was not debased and separated from
nature, as in Calvinism, but a participant in the workings of nature;
(2) God did not predetermine all activity, so the study of nature was
no longer discouraged as a form of heresy; (3) Nature was a representation of God-a community to which man owed reverence and obedience.
Wilderness experience reaffirms man's membership in the community of nature and of God: that has been a central theme of almost
all American environmentalists since the Deists. The Transcendentalists, for example, fully recognized the mystical relation between man
and nature. Ralph Waldo Emerson, the most influential of the Transcendentalists, praised the mystical qualities of nature in his first essay,
Nature, published in 1836: "In the woods, we return to reason and
faith . .. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; the
currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part and
parcel of God."2 "The whole of nature addresses itself to the whole
man," Emerson tells us, and "It is more than a medicine. It is health."'"
No American celebrates the sweetness of nature more lyrically
than Henry David Thoreau:
The true harvest of my daily life is somewhat as intangible and
indescribable as the tints of morning or evening. It is a little22stardust caught, a segment of the rainbow which I have clutched.
He communes with nature, "I go and come with a strange liberty in
Nature, a part of herself," 23 and he urges us "To anticipate not the sunrise and the dawn merely, but, if possible, Nature herself !" ' Yet, in all
of Thoreau's writing there is an undercurrent of discontent, almost at
times to the point of despair. He protests the materialist obsession of
society:
Most men, even in this comparatively free country, through mere
ignorance and mistake, are so occupied with the factitious cares and
superfluously coarse labors of life that its finer fruits cannot be
plucked by them.2"
The Transcendentalists' rejection of American social values was
20R. EMERSON, Nature, in SELECTED WRITINGS or EMRsoN 6 (B. Atkinson ed.

1950).

2'3 EMERsoN€ JOURNALS 453 (E.
22 H. THoREAu, WALDEN 148-49
23 Id. at 89.
24 Id.at 11.
25Id. at 3.

Emerson & W. Forbes eds. 1910).
(1960).

1975]

SOURCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHT

433

too radical for the expansion-minded temper of their times; just as the
Deists' creed, the pantheism of the Transcendentalists failed to win
broad support. Nevertheless, the Transcendental philosophy of nature
persisted as a force in environmental thought. The imaginative and influential conservationist, John Muir, describes the wilderness as "godful"
in a manner reminiscent of the Transcendentalists. In his book, My
First Summer in the Sierra, Muir writes: "The whole landscape
showed design, like man's noblest sculptures. How wonderful the...
beauty. . . . More and more, in a place like this, we feel ourselves part
of wild Nature, akin to everything."2 Muir's sentiment-like Emerson's,
Thoreau's, and the Deists'-returns us, at last, to Aldo Leopold's second
wilderness value: the appreciation of what he calls "the fundamental
'
organization of the biota."'1
Undoubtedly, it was Leopold's experience as .n outdoorsman that
fostered the development of his third set of values-a collection of
voluntary limitations on behavior that he calls "sportsmanship."2
Sportsmanship is voluntary, good behavior deriving from the recognition of one's involvement in the ecological chain. The sportsman's actions are voluntary because he performs without an audience. "Whatever his acts," Leopold stresses, "they are dictated by his own conscience, rather than by a mob of onlookers."2 Ethical self-dependence
teaches self-reliance, hardihood, thrift. It is difficult to exaggerate the
importance of these qualities (particularly self-reliance) in the fabric
of environmental thought.
These virtues spring from the depths of the American consciousness, for they are closely related to the Jeffersonian ideal of the independent yeoman farmer. Much as Leopold's sportsman must rely on his
own sense of values throughout his wilderness sojourn, so must the
land-holding yeoman depend on his own conscience concerning the use
of his land and its resources. Both the farmer and the sportsman ultimately lack access to outside sources for moral guidance. They stand
alone-powerful, and personally responsible for maintaining or violating
the stability, integrity, and beauty of the natural community.
The Agrarian philosopher finds even greater significance in this
ethical self-reliance than does Leopold. For Jefferson and other advocates of agrarianism, all virtues stem from self-sufficiency and selfreliance. Jefferson emphasizes this:
26J. Mum, My Frost SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 18, 326 (1911).
27A. LEOPOLD, sutpra note 2, at 178.
28 Id.
29

Id.
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Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon
of which no age nor nation has furnished an example.

[G]enerally speaking, the proportion which the aggregate of the
other classes of citizens bears in any state to that of its husbandmen, is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts .... 8'
Two principles underlie the agrarian belief that self-reliance is necessary
for the development of all virtues:
(1) self-reliance places one in
partnership with God; and (2) self-reliance is a fundamental component
of democracy.
The first of these principles-that self-reliance places one in partnership with God-is a concept that develops syllogistically. Farming is
an organic event, whereby one learns at first hand the truth that nature
can be commanded only by delicate obedience. Through this discovery,
one becomes involved in the biotic community as a guardian and protector. This protective and benevolent relation with nature is compatible with the work of God and places one in His partnership. Jefferson states the conclusion conscisely:
Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever
he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar
deposit for substantial and genuine virtue.3'
Thus, in full cooperation with God, and in gentle harmony with the
natural community, one is able to attain the nobility of character for
which one is intended.
The second tenet of agrarianism is that self-reliance is essential
for democracy. Jefferson envisioned an American society based upon a
system of land ownership which minimized the likelihood of a peasantbased economy. His yeoman class of cultivators would be above corruption by virture of the self-sufficiency of its members. And, the free
exercise of their diverse talents would improve the quality of the citizenry and ultimately the state. During the formative years of the Republic, rural life came to be associated with rarefied notions of pure
government, ideal politics, and democracy. This is illustrated by Jefferson's contemptuous description of "the mobs of great cities" as adding
to the support of pure government as do sores "to the strength of the
human body."8
Early American visions of an agrarian democracy were admixtures of political reality and philosophical idealism. Throughout Jefferson's political life, 90 percent of all Americans were farmers; and it was
0 "T.JEFFERSON,
31 Id. at 164-65.
32 Id.at 165.

NoTEs ON THE STATE OF VnGINIA 165 (W. Peden ed. 1955).
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generally believed that there was no limit to the land available for
small farms. Beyond these factual foundations, however, were the
egalitarian impulses implicit in early environmental thinking. "In this
admirably planned universe," an Enlightenment philosopher would explain, "every man has natural liberty." Similarly, the Declaration of
Independence appeals to the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God"
for liberty and justice. In short, rudimentary beliefs in liberty and
equality are closely tied to environmental thought and its respect for
nature. All men are equally endowed with the capacity to work the land
and appreciate nature; all virtues stem from these activities; respect for
man and for nature are correlative.
Jefferson's concept of agrarian democracy cannot survive serious
analysis. Nevertheless, the importance of farming during the early years
of the Republic led to an irrational but persistent blending of the virtues
of democracy with those of agrarianism. Those themes are so deeply
rooted in the American experience that they are applied to many nonfarm contexts. The creation of parks, wildlife reserves, and open spaces
in urban centers is justified by lawmakers and politicans in terms of
agrarian ideology-a continuing belief that the best in American private
and social character is to be found in the preservation of rural life and
the wilderness experience.
In each of the three nature values just discussed one finds a
seed-bed of another major line of environmental thought-a nostalgia
for a simpler life, with fewer people, more wilderness, and less complexity. This longing for simplicity is expressed by many environmentalists as distrust of, if not outright aversion to, two main components of modern civilization: technology and urbanism. As John
Muir insisted: "Compared with the intense purity, cordiality, and
beauty of nature, the most delicate refinements and cultures of civilization are gross barbarisms.""3 For Leopold, the barbarism of civilization consists in thoughtless application of machinery in a wilderness
context. He contrasts the pioneer methods of "go light" and "onebullet-one-buck" with gadgeteering of modem sportsmen. "Gadgets
fill . . . the auto-trunk, and also the trailer," Leopold laments."s
Mechanization debases the wilderness adventure. It deprives us of the
primitive, atavistic experience that is necessary to remind us of our national heritage; it separates us from the community of nature; and it
erodes our self-reliance. In short, Leopold feels that immoderate use
Muni, supra note 26, at 106-07.
8"A. LEoPoLD, supra note 2, at 180.
33 J.
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of machinery destroys the cultural values of nature.
These modern misgivings about technological progress echo views
commonly held by 19th century naturalists. Thoreau repeatedly criticized the materialism and insensitivity which he saw dominating society.
He decried "modern improvements":
[T]here is an illusion about them; there is not always a positive
advance. The devil goes on exacting compound interest to the last
for his early share and numerous succeeding investments in them.
Our inventions are wont to be pretty toys, which distract our attention from serious things. They are but improved means to an
unimproved end . .

.35

During roughly the same period that Thoreau was writing Walden,
Samuel Butler described the problem of mechanization with an eye to
the future: "We are daily giving them [the machines] greater power,"
Butler comments; "in the course of ages, we shall find ourselves the inferior race."
The 19th century naturalist was apprehensive about
technology: characteristically he foresaw a mechanical world antagonistic to natural and humane values. But his concern was vague and
ill-defined, perhaps because technology was just emerging as a force in
the affairs of men. By the 20th century, technology had fully arrived,
and so we turn to contemporary thinkers to discover the nature of the
problem.
Some eminent writers, Lewis Mumford, Hans J. Morgenthau and
Rene Dub6s among them, identify the problem of technology as the
failure of man to integrate his scientific pursuits with higher social
values. When we experiment with' the creation of life .and tinker with
the evolutionary process, we stray too far from valued ends. Our egoist
drive to dominate causes us to fashion more tools and build more machinery in order to dominate the world and decide its future.
Implicit in the idea that technology is misdirected and fails to pursue the public interest is a strong sense of the capacity of human beings
to exert control. As Mumford writes:
Technics and civilization as a whole are the result of human
choices.

.

.

.

No matter how completely technic relies on the

objective procedures of the sciences, it does not form an independent system.

.

. . The machine itself makes no demands and

holds out no promises: it is the human spirit which makes demands
and keeps promises.8 7
supra note 22, at 36.
36 Quoted in W. KUHNS, POST-INDUSTRIAL PROPHETS 16 (1971).
87 Quoted in MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND CIVILIZATION 12 (C. Walker ed. 1962).
35 H. THOREAU,
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Our technological predicament, according to this school of thought,
must be resolved by purposive reorientation of our institutions, and by
serious reevaluation of the nature of our scientific investigations. Vhile
these thinkers are far from optimistic, they maintain that it is within
our power to correct the course and put technology on the proper
heading.
In sharp contrast to this view stands the grim critique of the
French philosopher, Jacques Ellul. Ellul claims that machines are only
symptomatic of the problem. Technology's true impact, he holds, is
found in its total domination of life. He makes this clear in his definition of "technique":
The term technique, as I use it, does not mean machines, technology, or this or that procedure for attaining an end. In our technological society, technique is the totality of nzethods rationally
arrived at and having absolute efficiency .
in every field of
38

human activity.

This description of technique differs significantly from Mumford's.
Ellul does not see technology as a problem of machines, scientists, and
poorly chosen objectives. He refuses to accept the notion that men are
to blame for the abuses of technology. Such a belief rests on the supposition that men are able to orient technology for moral, and consequently,
nontechnical reasons. For Ellul, this concept ignores technical reality.
In his words:
[A] principal characteristic of technique .
it its refusal to
tolerate moral judgments. It is absolutely independent of them and
eliminates them from its domain. Technique never observes the
distinction between moral and immoral use. It tends, on the contrary, to create a completely technical morality.3 9
The technical morality Ellul speaks of is unwavering adherence to the
goal of absolute efficiency. Technology becomes more than neutral
matter; it is a self-contained force that functions outside the bonds of
human constraint, ever pursuing efficiency.
As Ellul sees it, technique has three chilling faces. It does not
allow freedom of choice, for it insists on selection of the more efficient
means. Moreover, it is self-augmenting. "[A]Imost without deliberate
will, by a simple combination of new data, incessant discoveries take
place everywhere," Ellul explains. "The qualities which technique requires for its advance are precisely those characteristics of a technical
39 J.ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SocIrT

in original).
30 Id.at 97.

xxv (J.

Wilkinson transl. 1964) (emphasis
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order which do not represent the individual intelligence." '
The autonomous and self-augmenting facets of technique form a
monistic whole which embraces all of the separate components. Technique and the use to which it is put are indistinguishable. Both polio
vaccinations and bacteriological warfare are of the same nature: each
adds dimension, without direction, to the technical mass-and both are
born .)nly of efficiency, evolving toward still greater efficiency, altogether
lacking regard for illness as opposed to health or life as opposed to
death. Whatever the objectives may be, they are pursued with equal
fervor and equal skill. Such is the world inhabited by Ellul's technical
phantasm.
We have seen thus far how nature values derive from Deism,
Agrarianism and Transcendentalism, and how those sources can lead
to the rejection of materialism, urbanism and technology. Undoubtedly,
the nature and wilderness philosophers' values (and anti-values) embody
the beliefs of some Americans. and probably some part of the beliefs of
many Americans.
There are, however, conflicting values which seem to me to be
closer to the mainstream of Western thought and culture: the values
of art, literature and music-the values of the created as opposed to
the natural. These values, too, are embraced by many Americans and in
some part, I venture to say, by most Americans.
It can be plausibly maintained that our dominant cultural values
derive from the city. The rise of Florence in the 15th century led to
a cultural explosion providing a richness and variety to life theretofcre
unknown in Western Europe. By the end of the 16th century, the
Renaissance had established artistic and cultural values which have ever
since tended to represent the highest aspirations of mankind-and these
are essentially urban values, for they depend on the city for nurture.
Perhaps the greatest creative achievements in Western civilization are
found in the works of Michelangelo, Shakespeare, Rembrandt and
Mozart, all men of the city. Without trade and commerce, which rest
on a base of technology and urban organization, an artistic culture
cannot exist, for there are no social resources to support it.
Should we conclude, then, that Leopold and the nature philosophers
do no more than express a personal preference for wilderness values
over urban values? Do-they establish for the rest of us the supremacy
of wilderness values? Does the wilderness remind us of our origins
and our history any more than Shakespeare? Are the ethical restraints
40-Id.

at 91-93.
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of wilderness sportsmanship any more compelling than the moral imperatives of urban life? Leopold and other naturalists have a single
vision of man's nature and needs. And in many respects it is an intensely American view, American in feeling a separation from Europe,
in celebrating our frontier, in surveying a country of spacious skies, of
amber waves of grain, and purple mountains' majesties. But do they
not ignore another vision, also widely shared? That other vision appeared in a newspaper in the fall of 1974. The article recounts the arrival of transfer students at Stanford University, a campus of 9000
acres, with spacious skies, some amber fields, and purple hills, if not
mountains, of some pretense to majesty. When asked to compare Stanford with City University of New York, one student said, perhaps inelegantly but with obvious deep feeling: "You could stagnate in a college community like this. . . not enough diversity. Where the city is,
that's where things are happening."'"
How do the environmentalists respond to this? A modern answer
may be found in the science of ecology and the rules of behavior some
commentators have founded upon it. And a contradiction of that answer
may be found in the work of neoclassical economists. Those two schools
of thought are considered next.
II
In treating Leopold's A Sand County Almanac as the epitome of
environmental thinking, we have focused so far on his poetic and instinctive treatment of the values of wilderness experience. But Leopold
was a scientist, and his book is permeated with insights from the science of ecology. "Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of
energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals," and
"When a change occurs in one part of the circuit, many other parts must
' 2
adjust themselves to it."'
Leopold was by no means the first to recognize the interworkings
of the natural world. In fact, the word "ecology" was coined nearly a
century earlier by the German zoologist, Ernst Haeikel, to describe the
life science dealing with the relationships between organisms and the
environment.43 Ironically, the word "ecology" was formed from the
word "economy," which preceded it by some 350 years; both words
derive from the Greek oikos, which means home or dwelling place.
Even before Haeckel and the advent of the science of ecology, natural41 San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, Sept. 8, 1974, § 5, at 5, cols. 1 & 2.
42 A. LEOPOLD, supra note 2, at 216.
4B See PRaNcIPLES OF ANIMAL ECOLOGY (1949).
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ists appreciated the seamless unity of Nature and extrolled its innate
wisdom. Ralph Waldo Emerson, for example, portrayed nature as more
than just material, but also as process and result. "All the parts incessantly work into each other's hands," Emerson wrote in one of his early
essays. He continued:
The wind sows the seed; the sun evaporates the sea; the wind
blows the vapor to the field; . . . the rain feeds the plant; the

plant feeds the animal: and thus the endless circulations of the
divine charity nourish man.,4
A more scientific contributor to ecological thought was the American diplomat and scholar George Perkins Marsh. Marsh's book, Man
and Nature; Or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action,
first published in 1864, has been praised as the first significant study of
the impact of man on his environment.," His thesis is that manmade
changes in the environment have effects on the fundamental harmony and
balance of nature more extensive and disruptive than may be intended
or foreseen. He remarks:
[T]he organic and inorganic worlds are . . . bound together by

such mutual relations and adaptations as secure, if not the absolute
permanence and equilibrium of both, a long continuance of the
established conditions at any given time. .
46
where a disturbing agent.

.

. But man is every-

Despite the observations and admonitions of this early American
naturalist, the science of ecology was not popularized until 1962, when
Rachel Carson's book, Silent Spring, was first serialized in The New
Yorker magazine. Silent Spring reiterates much of Marsh's themethat the balanced interaction between living things and their surroundings has been upset by man's reckless domination of nature. Carson's
book was immensely influential, for she provided a vivid and passionate
evaluation of the damaging effects of chemical agents-primarily DDT
-on the quality of all forms of life. "We stand now where two roads
diverge," Carson warned. In order to choose the road to salvation,
it is essential, she averred, to understand the rules of ecology.
For me, Barry Commoner's collection of essays entitled The
Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology provides the most accessible discourse on the principles of ecology and their relevance to social
policy. It is difficult to introduce The Closing Circle in a word or two,
20, at 5.
45 Lacey, Man, Nature and the Ecological Perspective, 8
46 G. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE 36 (1865).
4
7R. CARsoN, SILENT SPRING 277 (1962).
44P EmERSON, supra note

Am. STUDIES 15 (1970).
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just as it is difficult to characterize Professor Commoner briefly. He
is foremost a scientist-a biological scholar of renown-but he is also a
sensitive social philosopher and a colorful and expressive author. All
of these facets of the man are reflected in his essays: they are at once
vivid, straightforward and moralistic. Commoner constructs hypotheses regarding air pollution, contamination of waters, and threats of
atomic radiation-all based on measurable data. He argues in terms of
right and wrong with an urgent sense of moral duty. And he adeptly
uses metaphors which evoke in us his desired responses. "The environmental crisis is a sign that the finely sculptured fit between life and its
surroundings has begun to corrode." And he asks: "Where did the
fabric of the ecosphere begin to unravel?""4 But Commoner's central
'
metaphor is "the circle of life."49
These figures of speech are, of course,
more than simple literary devices: they do convey the essence of the
science of ecology; they do remind us of the cyclical flow of energy and
life, and of the impact of human activity on this cycle.
However, it is neither Commoner's scientific accomplishment nor
his literary style which interests me most. Instead, I will focus on Commoner the social philosopher, the biologist who extracts from scientific
principles a code for human conduct. He calls his informal prescriptions the Laws of Ecology ;"0 there are four of these:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Everything is connected to everything else;
Everything must go somewhere;
Nature knows best; and
There is no such thing as a fre lunch.

Although these prescriptions may be based on scientific principles, they
are normative, and therefore debatable, propositions.
The first law states that "everything is connected to everything
else." This may seem to be a simple iteration of the observations of
Marsh, Leopold, Carson and other ecologists, all of whom believed in
an elaborate web of interconnection among all organisms. Commoner,
however, analyzes the functioning of this network of interrelationships
in greater detail and with the benefit of modern scholarship. He contends that balance within the ecosphere is achieved by dynamic, selfcompensatory properties of the system, and he develops several examples
of this self-regulatory process. Consider the freshwater ecological cycle:
fish-organic waste-bacterial decay-inorganic nutr tents-algae-fish.
48 B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 11
49 Id. at 12, 299.
5o

Id. at 33-48.

(1971).
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If, due to unusually warm weather, there is a rapid growth of algae, the
supply of nutrients becomes depleted so that algae and nutrients are temporarily out of balance. But through self-correction the system reestablishes equilibrium. The surplus algae increase the available food
supply for fish; the fish eat the algae, thereby reducing the algal population and in turn increasing their own waste production, which, as the
waste decays, leads once again to a higher level of nutrients. Thus, the
freshwater ecosystem returns to proper balance.
In such a precariously balanced system there is always danger that
the entire chain may collapse if the self-compensating properties of the
system come under too much stress. When large amounts of human
wastes are introduced into the freshwater system, the bacterial activity
and oxygen consumption may increase so disproportionately to the production of oxygen by algae that the oxygen level goes to zero, and the
system collapses. In short, the self-correction that normally restores
balance cannot occur. Implicit in this law of limited self-regulation and
total interconnection within an ecosystem is a rule of conduct. The
lesson to be learned is: "Do not interfere with the system."
In my view, however, a prescription for behavior does not necessarily follow from a description of scientific fact. Even without human
intrusion, life systems may strike ecological balances at quite different
levels, and sometimes the operation of natural processes may change
their basic structures. Both the coming of the Ice Age and its retreat,
for example, had enormous impacts on the ecology of North America.
Yet, we make no judgments about the quality of the ecosystems before
and after the Ice Age; we merely observe that they were different. Thus,
the realization that everything is connected with everything else and that
intrusion into the life cycle may produce new ecological balance points
does not tell society whether, when, or how to act.
It is conceivable, for example, that depositing human wastes in
Lake Erie may be desirable, even though this will certainly change the
ecology of the lake. Simply knowing that human intrusion causes a
change in the system does not tell us whether that change is good or
bad., Ecology enables us to describe likely consequences of specific
acts, and it may even allow us to recognize that certain conduct
produces unknown and potentially dangerous effects. But the decision whether or not to engage in specific activities cannot be answered
merely by reference to the first law of ecology-that everything is
connected to everything else. That is true of everything good as well
as everything bad. It may seem intuitively right to extrapolate an ethic
against all human intrusion on the basis of ecological observations; but
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it is, nonetheless, an assignment of conservative values that we do not
find anywhere else in nature.
The second law of ecology-"everything must go somewhere"is an informal restatement of a basic premise of classical physics: matter
is indestructible. Commoner's use of this principle, however, is highly
didactic. He dispels the prevalent notion that discarded items simply "go
away" by tracing the ecological path of a comnon "throw-away," a
dry-cell battery containing mercury. 1 The battery is burned as rubbish.
The fire vaporizes the mercury which, carried by the wind, eventually
comes to earth in precipitation. It then flows into a ruountain lake, where
it condenses and sinks to the bottom. By chemical reaction it is converted to a soluble mercury compound which enters fish, and after the
fish encounter hook and frying pan, the mercury eventually enters man.
Underlying the law that everything must go somewhere is Commoner's directive that we avoid "artificial" materials-those not created
by nature-because of the dangers of introducing foreign substances
into the life cycle. He asserts:
One of the chief reasons for the present environmental crisis is that
great amounts of materials have been extracted from the earth,
converted into new forms, and discharged into the environment. . . . The result, too often, is the accumulation of harmful
amounts of material in places where, in nature, they do not belong. 2
This guide is not a certain one; it lacks discrimination. Natural
processes may cause mercury poisoning as surely as do artificial conversions. Similarly, disposal of nondegradable plastic wastes poses
problems different in kind from those of atomic waste disposal. Commoner's second law does not provide for such distinctions. Knowledge
that "everything goes somewhere" is not sufficient to resolve questions
regarding the wisdom of producing a particular artificial material.
The third law of ecology-that nature know., best-largely coincides with arguments presented by opponents of technology. Commoner
infers from that law "that any major man-made change . . . is likely
to be detrimental to the system." 3 Proof of this proposition is characteristically broad and proceeds by vivid analogy. Commoner asks us
to open our watches, close our eyes, and poke a pencil into the works.
This action is likely to cause damage, because the watchmaker has a
well-conceived design-just as nature does. Thus, interference with
natural design is probably harmful. Commoner's counsel is one of
5 Id.at 40.
Id. at 40-41.
53M.at 41 (emphasis in original).
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caution and prudence; he is no Luddite. But his suggestion that we regard manmade environments and manmade chemical compounds as
deleterious to the natural life cycle can be easily exaggerated by others.
At its extreme, the Third Law of Ecology encourages public policies
forbidding technological innovation.
The question that arises in the skeptical legal mind is whether we
can formulate sound policy on the presumption that natural things are
better than artificial ones. As John Maddox asks, was "the discovery of
bacteria and then of means of preventing infectious disease"', detrimental to the system? Some might answer that, viewed in full perspective, man's disease-fighting efforts do indeed seriously upset the design
of nature. Others insist that man's mastery of nature---his artificial
structures, machines, and synthetics--are as natural as was his use of
stones and branches for tools. Clearly, the issue of natural process versus
artificial intrusion needs a more precise evaluation than is provided by
the aphorism, "nature knows best."
The fourth and final law of ecology states that "there is no such
thing as a free lunch." This, needless to say, is not a postulate of physical science. Rather, it is Commoner's application to environmental
management of a familiar economic maxim, that benefits entail costs.
Commoner explains:
Because the global ecosystem is a connected whole, in which nothing
can be gained or lost and which is not subject to over-all improvement, anything extracted from it by human effort must be replaced.
Payment of this price cannot be avoided; it can only be delayed."
It is good to recognize this fact. However, the conclusion that man
should be slow to disturb natural processes outstrips the premise. The
proposition that every lunch has its price is not truly an answer; it is
merely a question. And the ultimate question is, how high the price and
how good the lunch. Ecology may be able to tell us the price, but it is
no Michelin guide to the quality of the forthcoming meal.
Ecological philosophy, as represented by Commoner, contains two
contradictory premises: the first is the value-free proposition that interrelations of nature's organisms may be observed and hypotheses then
constructed to allow prediction of the consequences of certain acts. The
second proposition is that because there are consequences which have
costs, certain acts should be avoided. At some level of cost, we may all
agree. But at lower cost levels there is bound to be disagreement. Even
51' J. MADDOX, THE DOOMSDAY SYNDROME 170 (1972).
" B. COMMONER, mtpra note 48, at 46.
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if the costs are indisputable, the benefits will be valued differently by
different individuals. The value judgment made by Commoner seems
to emphasize the costs and minimize the benefits. All four laws of
ecology counsel inaction: do not change nature; avoid technological
change; nature's way of doing things is best. Yet, when we ask the
ecologist, "why ?" we seem to be no farther along than we were before
the science of ecology arrived. His science does not answer; his value
system merely tells us his preferences, how he would weigh benefits and
costs. The ecologist-philosopher's premises, once distilled, rest on ethical
and aesthetic beliefs, not scientific facts. In my view, the Four Laws of
Ecology are philosophical heirs of the wilderness philosophers. In short,
the science of ecology may teach us a great deal about the workings of
nature, but the philosophy of ecology takes us little farther than Leopold's
intuitive Basic Law: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong
when it tends otherwise."'"
III
A third major intellectual influence on environmentalism is that
dismal science, economics. If environmentalists were to characterize
themselves as revolutionaries, they would almost certainly depict economists as counterrevolutionary adversaries. Leopold, for one, complains
that "some economists see the whole of society as a plaything for [their]
processes" ;17 while Commoner argues that "[i] f we are to survive, ecological considerations must guide economic and political ones""3 and not
vice versa. The environmentalists' disdain for economics is understandable, especially with respect to traditional or neoclassical economic philosophy. Yet not all economic theories are antithetical to the value system
of environmentalists. This may be demonstrated by examining the NeoMarxist school of economic thought, before we turn to the neoclassical,
capitalist precepts which are prevalent in our own society.
Neo-Marxism is, of course, an outgrowth of the thought of Karl
Marx. The principal contemporary refinement of Marxist doctrine is
set forth by Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy in their book Monopoly
Capital and is the perception that monopoly is the dominant economic
force in capitalist society. Monopoly capitalism derives its power from
the tendency of economic surplus to rise to the higher echelons of
' A. LFOPOLD,
571d.at

supra note 2, at 224-25.

186.

r8 B. Co.m N ER, supra note 48, at 292.
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society."' In this analysis, the difference between what a society produces
and the cost of production comprises the surplus which comes under the
control of corporate managers and owners. Baran and Sweezy state:
The size of the surplus is an index of productivity and wealth, of
how much freedom a society has to accomplish whatever goals it
may set for itself. The composition of the surplus shows how it
uses that freedom.6 0
Maintaining still the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, Baran and Sweezy see monopoly capitalism as the
thesis which, by its irrationality, creates its own antithesis, leading to
a new synthesis. The thesis of capitalism-maximization of profitsdictates the modes of surplus utilization-for example, advertising and
militarism-which promote the interests of the capitalist class. Such
use of surplus, however, inevitably generates contradiction or antithesis. The contradiction lies in the wide disparity between capitalists'
use of surplus and true human desires. Rather than stressing class
struggle, Neo-Marxists perceive a fundamental conflict between the
objectives of monopoly capitalism, with its misapplication of economic
surplus, and the very basis of life. Capitalist ideology, Neo-Marxists
assert, clings to anachronistic and moribund concepts, and, Uy manipulating surplus, it perpetrates half-truths that frustrate mankind liy
creating expectations which cannot be satisfied and represses impulses
which are neutral and healthy.
Richard England and Barry Bluestone present a Neo-Marxian
analysis of the pollution problem. At the root of the crisis, they state,
is the high premium we have put on material growth. So long as
either population or the material standard of living is growing the
total volume of pollution will eventually reach intolerable levels.61
The only way to avert that ecological Armageddon is to assure the
continual and rapid decline in the amount of pollution per unit of
production, and this is not likely to occur unless all production and consumption activities recycle all wastes. Alternatively, "if ecological
disasters are to be prevented and not simply postponed, material growth
must eventually be restricted. 6' 2 But the capitalist system requires rapid
and continuous growth to avoid mass unemployment and depression.
Thus, the private market economy operates on a treadmill: in order to
59 P. BARANr & P. SWEZY,MONOPOLY CAPITAL 52-78 (1966).
6o Id. at
61

9.
England & Bluestone, Ecology and Social Conflict, in TOWARD A STEADY-STATE
ECONOmy 198 (H. -Daly ed. 1973) (emphasis in original).
62 Id.
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forestall mass unemployment, growth patterns must be accelerated and
ever higher levels of consumption must be stimulated, adding endlessly
to pollution and eventually causing environmental collapse.
The Neo-Marxist prescription for escape from ecological disaster
is socialization of the economy. The premises of the argument are
broader than environmentalism, however; they rest on the character of
production in advanced societies and on the nature of man. All produc' ' on, it is contended, is social and not private. Consumption or product, on by any one person affects the welfare of others. Therefore,
economic policymaking should not rest with a few select individuals;
to assure responsible and equitable decisionmaking, everyone should
participate in determining what is produced, how it is produced, and how
it is distributed. Environmentally conscious groups in a socialist, participatory system, Bluestone and England contend, will direct consumptive energies toward public transport, communal shelter, and communityowned property.
While the Neo-Marxist vision of environmental lietterment through
social control and restraint of production appeals to the idealism of
many, much of the reasoning seems naive and muddled. Relying on
Marx's notion that the "essence of human nature"6 is realizable only
through the active relating of oneself to others and to nature, the NeoMarxists suggest that the new socialist society will assure a spiritually
overhauled citizenry. Instinctive drives and natural, transcendent values
will not be repressed or manipulated as in capitalist society. As true
human qualities emerge, values will become objective rather than subjective because there will be no basis for disagreement as to an object's
worth. According to the Neo-Marxists, wilderness and nature values
will emerge as objective and inviolable truths in a socialist state. Thus,
at the extreme limits of their idealism, some Neo-Marxist economists
ultimately endorse the naturalists' preference for wilderness values.
Optimistic as the Neo-Marxist ideal appears to be, England and
Bluestone concede that no existing socialist model has been wholly successful in dealing with the environmental crisis. Industrial pollution has
not been controlled; wilderness values have not triumphed. The Soviet
Union is roundly condemned for its authoritarian economic policies
which establish production quotas "without regard for controlling waste
and pollution"'" and which encourage personal consumerism. Although
the Maoist model receives better marks because of its emphasis on
as Quoted in Fromm, Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man, in MARX

CONTEPORaRY SCIENTIFIc THOUGHT 458 (1969).

66 England & Blutestone, supra note 61, at 207.
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communalism and because of its willingness to temper the rate of
material growth, it does not, they concede, offer an acceptable program
for America." Thus, for an analysis that fits our institutions and conforms to prevailing ideology, we turn to neoclassical economic theory.
The neoclassical economist sees man as a rational being who seeks
to maximize his own welfare. As a consumer he purchases goods and
services of various types up to the point where, for him, the value of one
more item just equals the value of some other alternative. Similarly,
the producer of goods and services manufactures up to the point where
the incremental cost of producing one more item just equals the price he
can obtain for it in the marketplace. Thus, the neoclassical economist
sees an allocation of resources that maximizes the public good by providing just the right amount and mix of goods and services that consumers desire. The price system provides signals to producers indicating that more or less of certain items are desired; it also rations scarce
goods and services among consumers. The operation.of the price system to produce this equilibrium is dependent on three conditions: (1)
perfect competition, manifested by the inability of any producer or consumer to affect price by his conduct; (2) good information about
supply, demand, and price; and (3) the absence of external diseconomies. It is this latter concept with which we are primarily concerned.
External diseconomies may de defined as the use of resources without cost to the user, but at a cost to others. Since the user does not pay a
price for the use of the resource, the price system fails in its function
of telling users how much to consume, and it further fails to ration the
resource adequately. This market failure results in pollution, an external diseconomy that distorts resource allocation. The air is polluted,
the traditional economists tell us, because the manufacturer can discharge wastes into the sky without paying a price for the use of clean
air. Nobody owns the air and hence nobody can sell it for waste disposal.
In theory, a group of citizens wishing to breathe clean air may approach the manufacturer and pay him to reduce his emissions. But in
practice, the group cannot accomplish this because the costs of getting
together are prohibitive. 6 For example, suppose that a manufacturer
is willing to install pollution control equipment in return for a $100,000
payment. And, suppose that each of 100,000 affected citizens is willing
to pay $1.10 to have cleaner air. If the formation of the citizen group
5Id. at 209.
66 See Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960).
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were costless, the group and the manufacturer would strike a bargain
for the installation of the pollution equipment at some figure between
$100,000 and $110,000. But, if it costs $20,000 for mailings, collection
of contributions, and other organizational expenses, no bargain can be
reached, since the clean air group has only $90,003 to offer the manufacturer. Even if transaction costs are reduced, the motivational problem of free riders exists: can a clean air group be organized in the first
place, in view of the individual's incentive to say, "Let George do
it" ?
This analysis-familiar enough to those who have considered the
economics of pollution-provides the basis for the neoclassical economists' solution to the problem of pollution. That solution is to create a
simulated market condition by establishing prices for the resources used
for the disposal of wastes. The most common suggestion is to establish
effluent taxes to be measured at the equilibrium point, that is, the point
at which the cost of removal of one more unit of pollution just equals the
amount of damages saved by the removal. It is at this point that the
resource is most efficiently used by society-partly clean and partly
dirty.
The implications of the neoclassical view of environmental protection now become clear. Society must strive to count the costs of
pollution and the costs of cleaning up. Yet there are no absolutes:
totally clean air, or 100 percent pure water, is not the goal of social
action. Instead, we must try to quantify the benefits of clean air and
water, and we should not spend money on pollution abatement in
amounts greater than the benefits. We should not, in short, have a national goal like that of the 1972 Water Pollution Act :"7 zero discharge
of pollutants. Indeed, we should not have standards at all, for standards,
except by accident, are going to be too high or too low in relation to
the damage imposed by pollution.
Other proposals for social action stem directly from the economists'
model and are even more imaginative. One that has yet to be tried but
that derives directly from economic theory, was first proposed by Professor Dales and has since attracted other academic support.68 Instead
of shadow prices by way of effluent charges, Dales proposed that we
create property interests in pollution rights (or, to economists, the allocational equivalent: property interests in pollution no-rights) and
then let bargaining determine the optimum level of pollution.
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1970). See text at note 71 infra.
as J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968).
6733
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While most of the neoclassical economic-thinking on environmental
issues has been directed toward pollution problems, some economists
have considered the significance of wilderness and nature values in
formulating sound social policy. Here, too, the gulf between the
economist and the natural philosopher is wide. As we have seen, the
naturalists' value scheme expresses a preference for natural processes
over the artificial, for wilderness over urbanization. The naturalists'
reasoning proceeds as follows: an individual is mentally healthier,
whether he knows it or not, if he can escape to nature; given such
healthy individuals, society will be better off; and even if this is not
the case, nature is irreplaceable and the minority who embrace wilderness
values are entitled to protection against irreparable loss. The latter argument is usually bolstered by invoking the claims of future generations
of nature-lovers-who may or may not be in the minority.
Some economists would scoff at these claims. They proceed from
a different set of assumptions-that each individual knows what is best
for himself (or at least knows better than anyone else), and that through
bargaining and the free exercise of consumer sovereignty, social welfare will be maximized. "Social welfare" in this usage is not an independent value with normative content. It is comprised of the sum of
individual preferences, whether they be "good" or "bad" from the standpoint of these economists' personal set of preferences.
Thus, wherever property interests in natural values can be created,
these economists would allow the market to allocate the resources. Take
the Grand Canyon National Park as an illustration. Assume that exclusive rights of use may be enforced at negligible cost, since access to the
park is easily controlled. In such a situation, a traditional economist
such as Milton Friedman would propose that the park be sold to the
highest bidder. "9 If a power company or Walt Disney Enterprises offers
more for the property than the Sierra Club or the Friends of the Earth,
it is because the greater social benefit, as perceived by consumers, lies
in commercial development of the canyon.
It is not that this economist personally believes that society is better
off with a pleasure palace or a power dam at the Grand Canyon; he sees
himself as value-free on the question of how the resource is to be used.
His value attaches to the process of allocation; he desires a procedure
that will allocate the resource in a manner that will produce the greatest
net consumer satisfaction. He accepts the results of dollar voting.
Other economists working within the neoclassical tradition strain
19 See M.

FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM

31 (1962).
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to avoid conclusions from a theory that calls for the sale of a Grand
Canyon."' They postulate an option demand-a consumer preference
that the Grand Canyon remain unspoiled-for which the consumer will
pay even though he never intends to visit the park. Having hypothesized this option demand, these economists can summon the standard
analysis of market failure to support government intervention. One
can never measure the aggregate value of the option demand because of
the free rider problem. Why should I contribute to the preservation
of the Grand Canyon if I think others will carry the day and me along
with it?
Just how these theorists justify "No Sale" when their theory
hypothesizes an inability to determine consumer preference is somewhat obscure. To the lawyer, they appear to be pk.ying the legal game
of burden of proof: make no change in the status quo until proponents
of change establish their case. But note that the fighting is internecine;
both groups of economists work within the constraints of consumer
preference. Their disagreement arises over measurement of aggregate
demand, not over how to act once demand is established.
The differences between the environmental philosopher and the
neoclassical economist are even wider and deeper than I have described
so far. They differ not only over the nature of man but over the proper
role of government in ordering society. Aldo Leopold represents a
long tradition in environmental thought in believing that man is a part
of nature, that his physical and mental wellbeing depend on rapport
with nature. When man seeks to escape the chain o I nature, when technology insulates him from primeval pursuits such as fishing, hunting,
and farming, he loses a vitality that makes for a healthy man and a good
society. The neoclassical economists regard man as both selfish and
rational: man seeks to maximize pleasure and minimize pain and has
the ability, through the exercise of reason, to make that calculus and to
act on its product. And the economists allow for a vast number of
different products in the sum of those individual calculations, for one
man's pain is another's pleasure.
The difference then between the environmental philosopher and
the economist is that the environmentalist discerns in all mankind certain
universal traits or common characteristics that lead man to construct
a hierarchy of values and that require society to adopt a set of policies
to implement those values. While the economist also perceives a basic
characteristic in all mankind, self-interest, his perception leads him to
70
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adopt not a value hierarchy against which to test public policy, but to
devise a process for accommodating a great variety of competing human
desires. The environmentalist would base public policy on a set of values
he holds to be transcendent and absolute, inherent in the nature of man
and therefore ineluctable. The economist rejects absolutes: what is
good is what the individual prefers; a good society is one that maximizes
freedom of choice. The economists' values speak to the question of how
society should be organized in order to satisfy individual desires, whatever they may be.
This difference in attitude toward the nature of man and what is
good for him produces a fundamental conflict between the two schools of
thought over the proper role of government in resource allocation and
environmental protection. While Leopold himself may recognize that
his cherished wilderness values may not be shared by the majority, and
while his writings may constitute an appeal to individuals to know themselves and change their ways, the environmental movement itself would
go further to employ government's power to protect society from itself.
The justification for government decree inheres in the environmentalists' fundamental beliefs: if it is true that mankind withers, that
society decays when we fail "to preserve the integrity, stability and
beauty of the biotic community," when we violate the Four Laws of
Ecology, then it easily follows that all possible actions must be taken to
avoid ecocide.
I must confess my unease with environmental postulates carried to
these conclusions. The result, too often, is the imposition by government
of flat rules reflecting absolutist values. The Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 197271 are an example. The stated national goal, to be achieved by 1985, is the elimination of the discharge
of all pollutants into the nation's waters. After 100 years of population growth and industrialization, our waters are to be restored to their
natural purity in 13 years. The goal is not likely to be achieved, for the
cost would run to hundreds of billions of dollars-some part of which
many would prefer to remain in the private sector to be spent by individual decision, and the other part of which, the dollars left in the public
sector, might bring greater satisfactions if spent on housing, education
and jobs.
The economists' model-and of course they neither invented it
nor does it belong to them exclusively-seems to me more in" keeping
112 U.S.C. § 24; 15 U.S.C. §§ 633, 636; 31 U.S.C. § 711; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-65,
1281-92, 1311-28, 1341-45, 1361-76 (Supp. III, 1973).
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with democratic theory in a pluralistic society. I would argue that the
proper role of the government in resource allocation and environmental
protection is to define property rights, so that market exchanges can
occur; to enforce those bargains and protect property rights so defined;
and to intervene in the economy when market failure produces external
diseconomies such as water and air pollution. But the intervention
should not be based on absolutist values of 100 percent pure water and
pure air, for some individuals (probably more than a few) would prefer
the alternative goods and services that could be produced by the resources
that environmentalists would devote to their absolutist goals."2
That the controversy over environmental protection should exhibit
a conflict between absolutism and pluralism should surprise no one: that
conflict has characterized many an earlier controver,y. As a society, we
seem to swing back and forth between the two poles, and as individuals
many of us do the same inside ourselves. But I would hope as we face
the environmental issues of the future that we would recall the admonitions of Learned Hand: "[W]e never shall get -dong in matters of
large public interest, if we proceed by generalizations, indeed, if you
insist, by principles, put forward as applicable in all circumstances"'
Liberty, the great judge says elsewhere,
is secure only . . . in that sense of fair play, of give and take, of

the uncertainty of human hypothesis, of how chang(able and passing
are our surest convictions, which has so hard
a chance to survive
74
in any times, perhaps especially in our own.

What is required is Hand's Spirit of Liberty, "the spirit that is not
too sure that it is right." 5
7 For a philosopher's attempt to justify an obligation to protect natural environments, see Sagoff, supra note 7, at 264-67. Professor Tribe has examined the

argument critically in Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures: Learning from Nature's Future, 84 Y.E L.J. 545 (1975). Building on his
earlier thought-provoking article, Tribe, Ways Not to Thztil, About Plastic Trees:
New Foundations for Enironmental Law, 83 YALE LJ. 1315 (1974), he seeks to
develop a value system that goes beyond the satisfaction of wants in utilitarianism and
recognizes rights in natural objects, with Kant rather than Bentham as the starting
point for new thinking. Moreover, Professor Tribe is vitally concerned with process in
building the new value system: "[I]ts central characteristic mulst be communal choice
in terms of principles 'capable of evolution as we change in the process of pursuing
them.'" 84 YALE L.J. at 552 (footnote omitted).
73L. HAND, THE SPIRIT oF LmERTY

74Id. at 76.
75 Id. at 190.

227 (1953).

